RaymondsIndex

On May 22, 2026, a KOSDAQ-listed company called Hankook Advanced Materials (062970) approved a KRW 10 billion private convertible bond. Half of that issuance went to Specialty Investment Co., an entity confirmed to be a special-related party of the de facto controlling shareholder, Satoshi Holdings. The disclosed use of proceeds was a single line: "acquisition of securities of other companies." That single line is the entire window the minority shareholder has into where KRW 10 billion of newly created liability is about to go. This is not a unique case. It is a template. The Cash Governance Question When a company raises capital, three things can happen. The cash goes into operations — equipment, hiring, inventory, working capital. The cash goes into capital efficiency — buybacks, dividends, debt reduction. Or the cash goes into something that looks like neither — short-term financial products, related-party loans, "other securities" with no further specifi...

Introduction In 2025, Herbalife Korea posted ₩2.8 billion in net income. By most standards, that looks like a profitable year. But the company simultaneously paid ₩8 billion in dividends to its US parent — a payout ratio of 283.7%. Over three years, retained earnings fell from ₩43.9 billion to ₩14.9 billion. More than 30% of revenue left the Korean subsidiary as service fees. When asked thirteen direct questions about the structure behind these numbers, the company said nothing. This is not a unique story. It is a pattern. The CEI Question The Capital Efficiency Index (CEI) in RaymondsIndex asks a deceptively simple question: Is the capital being deployed by this company actually generating returns — and returning them to shareholders? A low ROIC is one signal. But CEI is designed to catch something more specific: situations where capital is configured to move out of the company rather than compound within it. This includes subsidiaries that consistently pay out more than they ea...

1. The Week Opens With a Signal On May 19, 2026, Seoul Central District Prosecutors summoned a witness from the emergency response committee of Homeplus short-term bond victims. The investigation into MBK Partners — Korea's largest private equity fund operator — has entered its final stages. The allegation is stark: MBK management allegedly pushed ahead with issuing electronic short-term bonds while already anticipating Homeplus's financial crisis and a credit rating downgrade. The National Pension Service estimates its exposure at approximately ₩900 billion ($630 million). Retail investors who bought those bonds had no access to the same information. This is a Monday. And the week begins with a red zone signal. 2. What a Relational Risk Radar Actually Detects The Homeplus case is not an anomaly. It follows a structural pattern that repeats across Korean capital markets — and increasingly, across global private equity. At the center of RaymondsIndex's analytical frame...

In March 2026, Kakao — South Korea's dominant messaging and fintech platform — announced a deal that made headlines for all the right reasons: LY Corp, LINE Yahoo's investment vehicle, was injecting ₩300 billion into Kakao Games, becoming its new largest shareholder. The framing was classic: global ambitions, fresh capital, a Japanese tech giant entering Korean gaming. But the data told a different story. The Structure Underneath Kakao Games revenue had already collapsed — from ₩1.15 trillion in 2022 to ₩465 billion in 2025, a decline of nearly 60% in three years. Kakao, the parent, had simultaneously been pivoting toward AI, cutting its affiliate count from 147 to 94, shedding gaming subsidiaries like Nexports, Neptune, and Nimble Neuron. Kakao Games was not sold at its peak. It was sold on the descent — with Kakao retaining 14% and repositioning itself as an AI-focused platform while the subsidiary absorbed the legacy decline. The same week, a...

On May 6, 2026, South Korea's National Tax Service announced tax investigations into 31 listed companies — 8 on the KOSPI, 15 on the KOSDAQ — suspected of orchestrating stock manipulation, tunneling, and in some cases, deliberately forcing their own delistings. The suspected total illicit amount: over 2.2 trillion won (approximately $1.6 billion USD). One case in the investigation is particularly instructive. A controlling shareholder allegedly withheld audit documentation on purpose, engineering the company's own delisting. By the time individual investors realized what was happening, the damage was already irreversible. The controlling shareholder had already exited. What remained — the loss — was absorbed entirely by minority investors. The financial statement wasn't the signal. It was the aftermath. Information Asymmetry: The Operating System of Relational Risk This is information asymmetry in its most operationally precise form. The term — first formalized by George Ak...

Korea declared war on its corporate zombies. In February 2026, the Financial Services Commission and Korea Exchange jointly announced a "concentrated delisting management period" — running through June 2027 — with a dedicated task force of 20 regulators assigned to accelerate the removal of distressed firms. KRX's own simulation estimates that up to 220 KOSDAQ-listed companies could face delisting proceedings this year alone. Improvement windows have been cut from 18 months to 12. New triggers now include persistent penny-stock status and semi-annual checks for full capital impairment. It is the most aggressive market clean-up in KOSDAQ's modern history. Meanwhile, across the world, the UK's Resolution Foundation issued its own warning at the start of 2026: thousands of zombie businesses — kept artificially alive through years of low interest rates and pandemic-era support — are now buckling under what the Foundation called a "triple whammy" of high b...