RaymondsIndex

Two control contests reignited in Seoul in the first week of September, and the market priced them in opposite directions. At Hanjin KAL, the holding company for Korean Air and Asiana, Hoban Construction lifted its stake to 20.15% in July. Chairman Cho Won-tae and related parties hold 20.57%. Hankyung reports the gap as 0.42 of a percentage point; Money Today reports 0.41. The stock closed at 146,000 won on September 4, up 9.12% on the day and 21.3% over the month. At Korea Zinc, where Young Poong and MBK Partners opened a hostile approach two years ago, accumulation is largely complete and the contest has moved to an audit-committee election at an extraordinary meeting on September 9. That stock fell close to 10% across two sessions. Same category of event. Opposite reaction. The variable is not size. One number, read correctly The headline validation figure for RaymondsIndex is an 85.9% concordance across a sample of 3,109 Korean listed companies. That figure is routinely over-r...

Korean retail investors hold roughly $112 billion of US equities. Against a market that size, that is about 0.2 percent — a rounding error, and the number most often used to argue that Korean retail flow cannot matter systemically. Then look at the same money through a different denominator. At the end of August, Korean investors held $5.24 billion of the Direxion Daily Semiconductor Bull 3X Shares, or SOXL — 27 percent of that fund's $19.3 billion market capitalization. They held 38.8 percent of Direxion Daily TSLA Bull 2X, 37.6 percent of Direxion Daily MSCI South Korea Bull 3X (KORU), 20.9 percent of ProShares Ultra QQQ and 12.6 percent of ProShares UltraPro QQQ. Net purchases of SOXL alone came to $2.43 billion this year, 1.5 times their buying of the second-ranked Invesco Nasdaq 100 ETF. Roughly $10 billion went into leveraged ETFs in the first half. The event. On Sept. 1, Blue Ocean ATS suspended trading in 18 securities, most of them leveraged or inverse, including SOXL ...

On September 2, 2026, at its fifteenth regular meeting, Korea's Securities and Futures Commission referred an investor-relations officer at a KOSDAQ-listed company to prosecutors on suspicion of trading on material non-public information. The facts, as the regulator described them, are compact. The officer, working in IR, obtained the topline result of a Phase 1 clinical trial and news of a signed drug-licensing agreement before either became public. Between March and June 2024, shares in the company were bought through an account held in another person's name. The gain was approximately 20 million won. The officer also failed to file the ownership report that Korean law requires of insiders. Under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act, an insider who uses material non-public information in trading faces imprisonment of at least one year, or a fine of up to six times the unlawful gain, with an administrative penalty of up to twice the gain also available. ...

On September 1, GoPro announced it was being acquired. Starman Optical, a privately held maker of optical transceivers, will take roughly 90% of the company in a $285 million deal. Existing shareholders receive $1.14 per share in cash and retain about 10% of the combined business, which stays listed on Nasdaq; closing is expected by the end of 2026, subject to regulatory and shareholder approval. GoPro's roughly $92 million of outstanding debt is repaid in full at closing. The context matters more than the headline. In an August filing, GoPro told regulators that years of operating losses and deteriorating finances had raised "substantial doubt" about whether it would have enough cash to pay its bills and debts over the next year. Second-quarter revenue came in at $105 million, down 31% from a year earlier, alongside a $51 million net loss. Quarterly revenue had peaked above $630 million in the final quarter of 2014, shortly after the company went public. Back in April,...

The filing On 30 June 2026, a KOSDAQ-listed industrial firm, VitzroSys Co., Ltd. (054220), filed a material event report announcing the sale of a convertible bond it already owned. The instrument was its own 15th series — an unsecured, privately placed convertible issued 24 October 2024, maturing 24 October 2027, with a face total of KRW 3,000,000,000. The company had bought KRW 2,500,000,000 of that face value back from bondholders before maturity, in three tranches — 24 October 2025, 28 November 2025 and 27 April 2026 — paying KRW 2,558,919,830. The filing describes the mechanism plainly: acquisition of the bond before maturity by agreement with the bondholders. It then sold the same paper back out for KRW 2,500,000,000. Stated purpose: securing operating funds and the like. Price basis: determined by negotiation with the buyer, taking the company's overall circumstances into account. On the stated figures, the company paid KRW 58,919,830 more to retrieve the bond than it rec...

The standard picture of a capital-inefficient company is easy to draw. It stops investing. Revenue flattens or falls. Assets sit idle while management waits for a cycle that does not turn. Every screen in the market is built to catch that shape. A KOSDAQ filing from 31 August draws a different one. TKG Aegang, a maker of piping materials, saw its controlling shareholder TKG Taekwang file a tender offer statement that day — the second this year — as part of a move to take the company private. What sits underneath that filing is the more interesting document. In the FY2025 annual report, revenue rose from 58.41bn won to 64.73bn, an increase of 10.8%. Operating loss widened from 3.69bn to 10.84bn. Net loss widened from 1.93bn to 11.53bn. Operating cash flow ran at negative 1.0bn. Investing outflows reached 26.87bn. Financing inflows reached 29.68bn. And receivables climbed from 10.28bn to 14.77bn — a rise of 43.7%, more than four times the growth rate of the sales that produced them. ...