RaymondsIndex

Most coverage of Strategy's latest disclosure read it as prudence. A $4 billion dollar reserve, roughly 27 months of preferred dividends and debt interest covered, less need to sell assets into a weak market. That framing is not wrong. It is simply reading the wrong variable. Here is what the company filed with the SEC on August 3. Between July 27 and August 2, it raised about $395 million — $104.7 million by selling 1,638 bitcoin, and $290.6 million by issuing roughly 3.01 million common shares. Not one dollar of it purchased bitcoin. The bitcoin acquisition pause now runs six consecutive weeks, the longest since 2024. Of the proceeds, $250 million went into the dollar reserve, $81.2 million repurchased 912,143 shares of the company's own variable-rate preferred stock, and $52.4 million paid preferred dividends. About $11.7 million was retained as cash. Ninety-seven percent of a week's funding went to maintaining the capital structure rather than the asset that structure ...

Korea's financial regulator released its first-half 2026 direct financing data this week, and the headline everyone picked up was the obvious one: companies raised ₩126.6 trillion through public equity and corporate bond offerings, down 15.6% year on year — ₩23.4 trillion less than the same period last year. Equity issuance fell 29.6% to ₩3.0 trillion. IPOs fell from 42 deals to 28. Rights offerings dropped 29.5%, with large offerings above ₩100 billion falling from five to two. That reads as a sentiment story. The more useful number is buried two paragraphs down. Where the money actually went Of the ₩25.9 trillion raised through ordinary corporate bonds, 72.9% — ₩18.9 trillion — was used to repay existing debt. Working capital took 23.6%. Facilities took 3.6%. Meanwhile ordinary corporate bonds ran a net redemption of ₩9.6 trillion against ₩35.5 trillion of maturities, reversing net issuance of ₩6.5 trillion in the same period last year. And credit access narrowed: AA-and-abov...

Two markets crossed the same kind of line last week, using opposite mechanics. Side by side, they define relational risk better than either does alone. The line you cannot touch On July 28, KRX data showed eleven Korean listed companies designated as 관리종목 (administrative issue) during July for failing the market-capitalisation floor — ten on KOSDAQ, one on KOSPI. The mechanism is arithmetic: 30 consecutive sessions below ₩20bn on KOSDAQ triggers designation; failing to clear the bar for 45 consecutive sessions within the following 90 triggers delisting. The floor rises again to ₩30bn on KOSDAQ and ₩50bn on KOSPI in the first half of 2027. On July 27 the exchange disclosed that five more names had been below the line for 25 consecutive sessions and would be designated if that held five more. Then the case worth pausing on. 졸스 hit the same 25-session mark on July 22. The next day the share price rose, the closing market cap printed ₩20.5bn, and the designation risk lapsed. Operations ...

On 7 July the Korea Exchange published its monthly update on corporate value-up disclosure. The number that travelled was 85.5% — the share of total market capitalisation represented by companies that have filed a value-up plan since the programme began in May 2024. Underneath it: 741 companies cumulatively, 347 on KOSPI and 394 on KOSDAQ, with 12 new filers in June. Two other figures in the same release did not travel. First, the coverage number splits sharply by market — 89.4% of KOSPI capitalisation, 32.5% of KOSDAQ. Second, the number of companies that have submitted a periodic filing including an assessment of how the earlier plan actually went: 116. Tokyo's version of this looks much the same from a distance. The Tokyo Stock Exchange asked Prime and Standard Market companies in March 2023 to disclose actions reflecting cost of capital and share price. Prime Market disclosure passed 90% by March 2025, Standard sat near 50% as of April 2026, and more than 60% of respondents h...

On 30 July 2026, Enex Co. (KOSPI: 011090), a Korean kitchen-furniture manufacturer listed since 1995, disclosed that its controlling shareholder Park Jin-kyu and seven others had agreed to transfer 3,377,388 common shares — 28.48% of the company — to a vehicle named the Enex Future Growth Partnership. The price: ₩11,483,119,200. Read the payment schedule, though, and the deal thins out. ₩1.0bn was paid on signing. The remaining ₩10.48bn falls due on 4 September, and only "on the premise that all conditions precedent under the contract are satisfied." Nine days earlier, on 21 July, the company had approved a ₩5.0bn third-party placement — 2 million new shares at ₩2,500 to Queenver Mezzanine No.1 Partnership. The shares closed that same session at ₩1,458, down 24.46% on the day. Set against those two forward-looking promises is one backward-looking certainty. In December 2025 the Korea Fair Trade Commission provisionally levied ₩25.0bn in penalties on 48 furniture makers over...

On 30 July 2026, Korea's Financial Supervisory Service published its comprehensive plan to overhaul pharmaceutical and biotech disclosure. The reform is unusually specific about a single number: the total value of a technology-transfer agreement. Under the new framework, a licensing deal can no longer be disclosed as one figure. Companies must break it into four lines — upfront payment, development milestones, approval and sales milestones, and royalties — and state the payment condition and character of each. The FSS was explicit about why: because only the total was published, milestones and royalties, which are payable solely on the satisfaction of conditions, were being read as amounts already secured at signing. The reform reaches further back than that. At the IPO stage, the assumptions behind a valuation must now be set out in four standardised categories: expected market size, probability of clinical success, approval and review risk, and development period and cost. Expe...