RaymondsIndex

On 16 June 2026, Korea's Financial Supervisory Service released its analysis of FY2025 audit opinions for listed companies. Most coverage led with the alarming number: among companies that received a clean opinion but carried a going-concern emphasis paragraph, 32.1% were delisted or received a modified opinion the following year. It is an alarming number. It is also the least interesting thing in the release. The opinion line is not the signal Of 2,702 listed companies analysed, 2,637 — 97.6% — received an unqualified opinion. That figure has not left a narrow band since Korea's 2019 external audit reform: 97.2% in 2021, 97.9% in 2022, 97.5% in 2023, 97.5% in 2024, 97.6% in 2025. Any variable that assigns the same value to roughly 97 out of 100 observations carries almost no classifying power, regardless of how carefully each individual value was determined. This is a property of the distribution, not of the auditors. Where the separation actually lives The separation s...

On 4 August 2026, KOSDAQ closed up 5.88% at 780.72, triggering a buy-side sidecar for the third consecutive session — three in a row had never happened there before. The three-day cumulative gain was 21%. The dominant framing was straightforward: individual investors were rotating out of large-cap semiconductors and into small-cap growth. Then read the flow ledger for the same day. On KOSDAQ, institutions net bought ₩543.4bn. Foreign investors net sold ₩277.2bn. Retail net sold ₩258.6bn. Meanwhile on KOSPI — up only 1.62% after trading as low as 6,080.25 intraday — retail net bought ₩818.6bn, while institutions net sold ₩539.4bn and foreigners ₩369.9bn. The reporting notes retail buying concentrated in the semiconductor names that had dropped more than 8% the previous session. Two things were true at once. Only one made the headline. The path, not the price Relational risk research describes five paths by which network risk is realised. The fifth is retailization : the party facing the...

On 4 August 2026, the Seoul Southern District Prosecutors' Office announced indictments in a KOSDAQ market manipulation case. Two men were indicted in custody — the company's former chief executive and a professional manipulator — and a third, a former director of a subsidiary, without detention. The conduct they are alleged to have committed took place between 15 May and 10 July 2017. Nine years, two months and twenty days separate the first manipulative order from the day the public could read about it. The headline number is ₩5.7bn in alleged illicit gains. The number that matters more is 80.6%. The funding, not the price According to prosecutors, the former CEO acquired a 19.96% controlling stake — 1,636,364 shares — for ₩18.0bn in March 2017, without committing capital of his own. ₩14.5bn of that, 80.6%, came from a loan secured against the very shares he was buying. The remainder came from financial investors attracted with promises that their principal would be guaran...

Korea's junior exchange spent July doing something that looks, on a screener, like repair. As of July 22, KOSDAQ companies had filed 72 capital-reduction decisions this year — more than the 62 filed in all of last year, with five months still to run. The concentration is in no-consideration reductions, where shareholders receive nothing and paid-in capital is written down against accumulated deficit. EV Advanced Materials filed a 90% reduction on July 13, cutting paid-in capital from ₩29.79bn to ₩2.98bn; the stated purpose was "improving financial structure by offsetting accumulated deficit." KS Industry filed a 75% reduction on June 24, taking paid-in capital from ₩20.19bn to ₩5.05bn. Here is what matters about these filings, and it is the part the ratio hides. A no-consideration reduction is a zero event for resources. No cash arrives. No cash leaves. The asset side of the balance sheet does not move by one won. What changes is a label on the right-hand side: capita...

Most coverage of Strategy's latest disclosure read it as prudence. A $4 billion dollar reserve, roughly 27 months of preferred dividends and debt interest covered, less need to sell assets into a weak market. That framing is not wrong. It is simply reading the wrong variable. Here is what the company filed with the SEC on August 3. Between July 27 and August 2, it raised about $395 million — $104.7 million by selling 1,638 bitcoin, and $290.6 million by issuing roughly 3.01 million common shares. Not one dollar of it purchased bitcoin. The bitcoin acquisition pause now runs six consecutive weeks, the longest since 2024. Of the proceeds, $250 million went into the dollar reserve, $81.2 million repurchased 912,143 shares of the company's own variable-rate preferred stock, and $52.4 million paid preferred dividends. About $11.7 million was retained as cash. Ninety-seven percent of a week's funding went to maintaining the capital structure rather than the asset that structure ...

Korea's financial regulator released its first-half 2026 direct financing data this week, and the headline everyone picked up was the obvious one: companies raised ₩126.6 trillion through public equity and corporate bond offerings, down 15.6% year on year — ₩23.4 trillion less than the same period last year. Equity issuance fell 29.6% to ₩3.0 trillion. IPOs fell from 42 deals to 28. Rights offerings dropped 29.5%, with large offerings above ₩100 billion falling from five to two. That reads as a sentiment story. The more useful number is buried two paragraphs down. Where the money actually went Of the ₩25.9 trillion raised through ordinary corporate bonds, 72.9% — ₩18.9 trillion — was used to repay existing debt. Working capital took 23.6%. Facilities took 3.6%. Meanwhile ordinary corporate bonds ran a net redemption of ₩9.6 trillion against ₩35.5 trillion of maturities, reversing net issuance of ₩6.5 trillion in the same period last year. And credit access narrowed: AA-and-abov...